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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

CODY SCHROEDER,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant,

v.
ERIK K. PARTIN,
Defendant-CounterplaintiffRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 37228-2009
Twin Falls County Docket No.
2008-5227

A MOTION TO AUGMENT was filed by counsel for Respondent on June 10, 2010.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT be, and hereby is,
GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, file stamped
copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Memorandum Opinion Re: Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict or in the Altemative New Trial and on Cross Motions of the Parties for Attomey
Fees and Costs, file-stamped November 25,2009.
DATED this

'I

C

ko

day ofJune 2010.

For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record

MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD

Docket No. 37228-2009
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

Cody Schroeder,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Erik Partin,
Defendant.

----------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2008-5227
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE NEW TRIAL AND
ON CROSS MOTIONS OF THE
PARTIES FOR ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS

This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendant for Judgment NOV or
New Trial and on the cross motions of the parties for an award of attorney fees and

costs.

Plaintiff ("Schroeder") is represented by Brooke Baldwin, Attorney at Law.

Defendant ("Partin") is represented by Lane Jacobsen, Attorney at Law. Argument of
these matters was presented on November 23, 2009 and the matter is deemed under
advisement as of that date.
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INTRODUCTION

Schroeder sued Partin for allegedly breaching a contract involving the assembly
and installation of a hemi engine into a Barracuda car.

Partin sued Schroeder for

payment of his services relating to this work. The case was tried to a jury which
answered special interrogatories and determined that both parties breached their
agreements. The jury awarded Schroeder $7,578.11 as a consequence of Partin's
failure to properly assemble and install the engine in the car. The jury also awarded
Schroeder $10,000 for breaching a performance agreement executed between the
parties. In doing so it specifically found that there was consideration for the performance
agreement, that Partin breached the agreement and that the damage clause in the
performance agreement met the criteria set forth in the jury instructions. The jury also
found that Schroeder owed Partin $9,221 for the reasonable value of parts and services
provided by Partin to Schroeder.
Accordingly, the Court entered a net judgment on October 6, 2009 in favor of
Schroeder in the amount of $10,685.11. 1 On October 16, 2009, Partin timely filed a
Motion for Judgment NOV or in the Alternative for a New Trial. Schroeder has filed an
objection to this motion.
On October 19, 2009 Schroeder filed a Motion and Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees seeking costs as a matter of right of $1096.88, discretionary costs of
$152.29, and attorney fees of $21,664.75 for the four attorneys from Wright Brothers
Law Office, PLLC who worked on the case. Schroeder claims that he is the prevailing
party in this case. Partin has not filed a formal objection to this motion but asserts in his

1 This amount reflects the parties' stipulation that Schroeder had previously paid Partin $2,328.00 for his
services. The net result of this stipulation reduced the "award" to Partin to $6893.
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motion for fees that he also prevailed in this action. The Court considers this as a valid
objection to an award of fees and costs, albeit not an objection to the amount of those
fees and costs.
On October 20, 2009 Partin filed a Motion and Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees seeking costs as a matter of right of $1,213.94 and attorney fees of

$22,289 for Mr. Jacobson.2

He claims that both parties should be considered a

prevailing party. Schroeder filed a timely objection to this motion asserting that he is the
prevailing party in this action. However, he did not object to the amount of those fees
and costs.

A. Motion for Judgment NOV or for New Trial.
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("NOV") the moving party
admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may be legitimately
drawn therefrom. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 274, 561 P.2d 1299,
1307 (1977). Such a motion should not be granted if there is substantial evidence to
support the verdict. Id. All that is required is that the evidence be of such sufficient
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude the verdict of the
jury was proper. Id. In considering this motion the trial court is not free to make its own
findings of fact but must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 420, 835 P.2d 651, 655 (Ct. App.
1992).

2 The Court notes that another attorney also represented Partin during the course of this litigation. However, no fee
claim has been submitted for the services of that lawyer.
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The standard to be applied when ruling on a motion for new trial pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) is much different.

In ruling upon a motion for a new trial premised

upon inadequate or excessive damages, the rule the trial court must follow is set forth in
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,603 P.2d 575 (1979):

Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or excessive
damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the
jury's award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the
disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not
stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor
is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is
sufficient. A trial court is not restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or
excessive 'as a matter of law.' Blaine v. Byers, supra. Additionally, the rule
that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial but
conflicting evidence has no application to trial court ruling upon a motion
for a new trial. Blaine, supra; Rosenburg v. Toetley, 93 Idaho 135, 456
P.2d 779 (1969)." Id. at 625-26, 603 P.2d at 580-81.
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986).

There is a qualitative difference between a trial judge's role in deciding whether a
new trial is justified based on the insufficiency of the evidence under Rule 59(a)(6), and
whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's award of damages
under Rule 59(a)(5). On a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), unlike a
motion for a directed verdict or judgment NOV the trial court has broad discretion to
weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and it may set aside the verdict
based upon its independent evaluation of the evidence, even though there is substantial
evidence to support the verdict. Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 631, 769 P.2d
505, 508 (1989). In considering a motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficient
evidence under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), the trial court is required to undertake a two-part
analysis. First, the court is to consider whether the verdict was against the weight of the
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evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict The court
then must consider whether a different result would follow in a retrial. Burggraf v.
Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 174, 823 P.2d 775, 778 (1991). The trial court is not merely

authorized to engage in this weighing process, it is obligated to do so. Sanchez v.
Galey, 112 Idaho 609,614,733 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1986), Litchfield, 122 Idaho at 422.

1. Damage award for repairing the engine.
Partin asserts that the jury miscalculated the amount of damages awarded to
Schroeder for repair of the engine and that the verdict should be reduced by $1,548.
He makes this argument based upon his analysis of the repair bill of Mark Kidd.
Schroeder presents a different interpretation of Mr. Kidd's bill and further asserts that
there were items of property not returned to Schroeder, but which he had paid for.
Applying the standards set forth above the Court denies Partin's motions for
judgment NOV concerning the damage award for repairing the engine. There is
substantial evidence to support the juris findings of damages as noted in Schroeder's
briefing. Likewise there is no basis for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) because this
award does not "shock the conscience" of the Court.

Nor was there insufficient

evidence in the record to support the jury's finding on this issue and thus no basis for a
new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6).
2. The Performance Agreement.
When Schroeder and Partin reached an agreement for Partin to build and install
the hemi engine they did not agree on a time when this task was to be completed. By
September 2008 Schroeder became dissatisfied with Partin's lack of performance arid
visited Partin at his shop. Shortly thereafter Partin, unsolicited, prepared a written
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statement advising Schroeder that if he, Partin, did not complete the project by October
8, 2008 that he would pay Schroeder a "penalty" of $2500 and $100 per day until the
project was completed. This statement was presented to Schroeder at Partin's request.
Schroeder countersigned the statement.
Partin did not receive possession of the vehicle until 75 days after the deadline
set forth in the performance agreement. Mathematically then, Partin owed Schroeder
$10,000. The foregoing evidence was uncontradicted at trial. The jury was instructed
concerning liquidated damages pursuant to IDJI 9.04 and on the law of consideration.
The jury determined that Partin owed Schroeder $10,000.
Partin continues to argue that there was no consideration for the performance
agreement, and that even if there was this award constitutes an inappropriate penalty
and the jury's verdict must be set aside. The jury made a specific factual finding that
this agreement was supported by consideration. Throughout this case Schroeder has
argued that ailowing Partin to keep the vehicle after his visit in September 2008 until
October 8, 2008 constituted a form of forbearance of his right of possession of the
engine and car. This argument was made to the jury. Partin asserts that Schroeder
had no right of possession because his bill had not been paid and he had a right to
possession of the engine and car in order to preserve his lien rights. This argument
was also made to the jury.

Schroeder counters this argument by pointing out that

Schroeder did not even know of the billing until December when he received possession
of the vehicle following court action. This argument was also made to the jury.
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As noted the jury was instructed regarding the law of consideration.

Jury

Instruction No. 35. Partin's offer to complete the vehicle by a stated time (October 8)
modified the terms of the parties oral agreement and set a definite time for performance.
Schroeder accepted this unilateral contract modification when he was not required to do
so. In doing so he gave up something of value-the right to obtain possession of his
vehicle. It is immaterial whether he could in fact have obtained possession because of
the asserted lien rights.

The forbearance has some value and thus is valid

consideration. The Court finds that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's
finding in this regard and for that reason Partin's motion for judgment NOV on this issue
must denied.
Partin further contends that the jury erred in concluding that the contract was a
valid liquidated damages provision. To prevail on this issue the Court must be satisfied
that the trial record establishes that:

1) the damages to not bear any reasonable

relationship to the damages actually sustained and are exorbitant; and/or 2) the
damages are not intended to be compensation for the consequences of a breach of the
contract, but rather a penalty. Jury Instruction 40A. Partin bears the burden of proof on
these issues. Id.
If there is substantial evidence to support a finding that $2,500 for two weeks of
continued possession of the vehicle by Partin and $100 per day thereafter until the
vehicle is completed bears a reasonable relation to damages actually sustained by
Schroeder, then the motion for judgment NOV must be denied. After carefully analyzing
the evidence presented in this case, the Court concludes that there is not substantial
evidence to support the jury's award of damages for breach of the performance
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agreement and Partin's motion for judgment NOV must be granted.

The Court

concludes that not only could reasonable persons not make this finding, but that it is a
penalty and exorbitant under the facts of this case.
The parties here are not in disagreement concerning the test as to the validity of
liquidated damages.

In McEnroe v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 600 (Ct. App.

1984) our Court stated:
Generally speaking, parties to a contract may agree upon liquidated
damages in anticipation of a breach, in any case where the circumstances
are such that accurate determination of the damages would be difficult or
impossible, and provided that the liquidated damages fixed by the contract
bear a reasonable relation to actual damages. But, where the forfeiture or
damage fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation
to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and unconscionable, it is
regarded as a "penalty", and the contractual provision therefor is void and
unenforceable.Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451,456,272 P.2d 1020, 1023
(1954). See also Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977);
Schlegel v. Hansen, 98 Idaho 614, 570 P.2d 292 (1977). The question
before us, then, is whether the forfeiture of the Midland property as
liquidated damages was reasonable in relation to the actual damages
suffered by the McEnroes and was not "exorbitant and unconscionable.
106 Idaho at 326.
The evidence produced at trial does not support the jury's verdict. Schroeder
asserts that the performance agreement provides for valid damages to compensate
Schroeder for: (1) value of possession of the vehicle; (2) compensation for decrease in
the market for such vehicles; and (3) as an offset for any moneys owed to Partin. In
addressing this issue the Court must focus on whether the liquidated damages fixed by
the contract bear a reasonable relation to actual damages. The only testimony in this
case concerning "actual damages" suffered by Schroeder was his generic testimony
that the market value of barracuda cars with hemi engines was decreasing from the
time that he started the project until his receipt of possession of the vehicle in December
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2008. There was no direct testimony of this "market decline" between September 2008
and December 2008-the time relevant to the liquidated damage issue. His testimony
that a "fair value" of damage was $100 per day based upon the daily "fair rental" value
of a vehicle also does not support his position. He did not drive this vehicle and only
intended to "flip" it. Schroeder argues that Partin achieved a benefit from continuing to
possess the vehicle. The test for damages when evaluating a liquidated damages
clause is the damage occasioned by the non breaching party, in this case Schroeder,
not Partin. Offsetting Partin's bill against the contract damage amount is likewise not
the proper test when evaluating the "actual damages" sustained by Partin. There is no
evidence upon which a jury could conclude how the sum of $2,500 represents a
reasonable measure of damages for continued possession of the car for two weeks as
compared to $100 per day thereafter. Simply stated, this jury did not have evidence
that would permit them to make the evaluation required by the jury instruction.
Schroeder argues that Partin failed to offer any evidence to establish that the
liquidated damages provision was not reasonably related to the damages actually
suffered by Schroeder or that such provision is exorbitant or unreasonable. The Court
again disagrees with Schroeder's analysis. True, Partin did not bring in witnesses to
affirmatively demonstrate there was no actual loss to Schroeder. Nor was he required
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Schroeder's own admissions (other than his vague assertions of damage) established
there was no actual damage reasonably related to the performance contract.
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The fundamental flaw with Schroeder's approach in this case is that the parties
never negotiated a liquidated damages clause. At most the evidence merely shows that
Partin came up with the $2,500 figure because that was his "standard deaL" Does
Partin's acknowiedgement that $2,500 is a reasonabie sum for continued possession of
the vehicle for two weeks satisfy the lack of proof of actual damages?
concludes that it does not under the circumstances of this case.

The Court

The parties' mere

statement in an agreement of the damages is not sufficient to satisfy the test concerning
the reasonableness of liquidated damages. If it was then there is never a reason to
evaluate these clauses. Partin's acknowledgement of the amount of damages is not the
proper test for evaluating reasonableness.
The Court is mindful of the standards that must be followed by this Court in ruling
on a motion for judgment NOV. This Court is also mindful of the deference it must give
to a jury verdict. However, under the circumstances of this case the Court is left with
the firm belief that the performance contract provides for no more than a penalty and
that based upon the evidence presented at trial it has no reasonable relation to the
damages actually sustained by Schroeder occasioned by Partin's failure to timely
complete the project. Indeed Partin's own words state that these sums are a "penalty."
Moreover, under any reasonable view of the evidence a $10,000 award for a three
month delay in completing a project that had already consumed nearly two years is
exorbitant given that the total compensation to be received by Partin was just slightly
more than this figure.
For these reasons Partin's Motion for Judgment NOV on this issue shall be
granted. In light of this ruling the Court need not address Partin's Motions for new trial.
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B. Motions for Costs and Attorney Fees.
"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as
defined in [1.R.e.p.] 54(d) (1) (8), when provided for by any statute or contract." It is
undisputed by both parties that attorney fees are awardable pursuant to I. C. § 12-120.
I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1)
(8). Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(8), there are three principal factors the
trial court must consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed:
(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2)
whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3)
the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or
issues. Chadderdon, 104 Idaho at 411, 659 P.2d at 165. The "result
obtained" may be the product of a court judgment or of a settlement
reached by the parties. Jerry J. Joseph C.L.v. Assoc., supra; Ladd v.
Coats, 105 Idaho 250,668 P.2d 126 (Ct.App.1983).

Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259,999 P.2d 914 (Ct
App.2000).
Where there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that a
party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award
of fees to the prevailing party on that claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates
an award of fees only to the party or parties who prevail "in the action." Chenery v. Agri-

Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687,692,682 P.2d 640,645 (Ct.App.1984).
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Discretionary costs "may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of
justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(D).
In this case both parties ciaim that they are the "prevaiiing party." The Court
concludes that both parties prevailed in this case within the meaning of I.R.C.P.
54(d)(1)(B). The gravamen of this action by Schroeder was that the hemi engine was
not properly built and that he was damaged to the extent of monies incurred to repair
the engine. The jury sided with him on this issue. The gravamen of Partin's counterclaim
was that he had not been paid for his services. The jury also sided with him on this
issue, albeit it did not award all of the damages that Partin sought.
But Schroeder contends that the jury's award of damages for breach of the
performance contract "tilts the scale" and makes him the prevailing party because he
recovered on all of his issues, not just some. The Court disagrees with this assertion.
First, the Court has granted Partin's motion for judgment NOV. Thus, there is no great
disparity in the amounts of damages awarded to either party.

Second, while Schroeder

prevailed on his damage claim because he recovered more damages than Partin
(approximately $700) does not necessarily make him the prevailing party. The issues of
the complaint and the counterclaim were intricately intertwined. Schroeder's percentage
of recovery based upon his proof at trial was greater than Partin's percentage of
recovery.

However, even this disparity is insufficient to convince the Court that

Schroeder prevailed "in the action." In its discretion the Court concludes that both
parties prevailed in this case.
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There is a more fundamental reason why both sides are entitled to the costs of
right and attorney fees claimed in this case.
claimed fees and costs.
waiver thereof.

Neither has objected to the amount of

Failure to object to timely object to a cost claim constitutes a

i.R.C.P. 54(d)(6). This rule places an affirmative burden on the

objecting party to challenge the amount of costs claimed. Schroeder's objection does
not challenge the amount of fees claimed. Of course he argues that Partin is not the
prevailing party. Partin's motion asserts that both parties prevailed and hence suggests
that neither side should be awarded fees or costs but likewise does not challenge the
amount of fees claimed. The Court concludes that both parties have waived objections
to the amount of each other's cost bill.

However as stated above, both parties are

entitled to an award of fees and costs as a prevailing party.
Even in the absence of an objection it is the obligation of the Court to review an
award of attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e) (3). The Court has examined the
affidavits of all counsel and considered all of the factors set forth in this rule. Having
done so, in the absence of some specific objection to the cost bills, the Court concludes
that the costs of right and attorney fees claimed shall be awarded to each party as
requested. The discretionary costs claimed by Schroeder will not be allowed because
there is no showing that these costs were "necessary and exceptional" as required by
I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1).

Schroeder is awarded costs of right in the sum of $1,096.88 and attorney fees of
$21,664.75 for a total cost award of $22,761.63. Partin is awarded costs of right in the
sum of $1 ,213.94 and attorney fees of $22,289.00 for a total cost award of $23,502.94.
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CONCLUSION

Partin's Motion for Judgment NOV is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART
as set forth above. Partin's Motion for New Trial is DENIED. 80th parties' motions for
attorney fees and costs are GRANTED, except for the disallowance of Schroeder's
request for discretionary costs.

Schroeder shall be awarded $7,578.11 damages and

$22,761.63 for attorney fees and costs for a total award of $30,339.74. Partin shall be
awarded $9,221.00 damages (less $2,328) and $23,502.94 for attorney fees and costs
for a total award of $30,395.94. Therefore an Amended Judgment shall enter in favor of
Partin in the amount of $56.20. Plaintiff's writ of execution is quashed and any order
staying execution of judgment shall be vacated.

Dated this

~Y

of November 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/).2

I hereby certify that on the
day of November 2009, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Brooke Baldwin, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 226
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303

~.S.Mail
( ) Hand delivered
( ) Faxed
( ) Court Folder

V. Lane Jacobson, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5827
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-5827

a()' U.S. Mail
. () Hand delivered
( ) Faxed
( ) Court Folder

~~
Clerk
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